Environmental consultants are facing an increasing number of lawsuits initiated by third parties with whom they did not contract. These lawsuits are particularly vexing for consultants because they are filed by strangers to their contracts, and the claimed damages often exceed the value of the underlying contracts and any profits that were earned. Further, plaintiffs seek damages that were not contemplated when the work was undertaken, and the claims relate to work that the consultants did not agree to perform. Moreover, even if a consultant ultimately is successful in its defense, the victory comes at a high cost; these complex cases typically involve numerous parties and experts, and the defense costs can be staggering.
INTRODUCTION
Environmental consultants are facing an increasing number of lawsuits initiated by third parties with whom they did not contract. These lawsuits are particularly vexing for consultants because they are filed by strangers to their contracts, and the claimed damages often exceed the value of the underlying contracts and any profits that were earned. Further, plaintiffs seek damages that were not contemplated when the work was undertaken, and the claims relate to work that the consultants did not agree to perform. Moreover, even if a consultant ultimately is successful in its defense, the victory comes at a high cost; these complex cases typically involve numerous parties and experts, and the defense costs can be staggering.
This article is a two-part discussion of the developing case law addressing the liability of environmental consultants. The first part examines the liability of consultants under traditional common law principles. The second part discusses the liability of consultants under the federal Superfund statute. Although the law in each state and the Federal Circuit frequently differs and should be examined from the perspective of the controlling principles in a given case, some general trends are emerging. This article also considers practical riskavoidance measures that consultants can take to avoid lawsuits or minimize their impact.
TYPICAL CASES
The potential liability of consultants to third parties arises in many different contexts. Most early cases filed against consultants involved accidents resulting in personal injuries. Although these cases still are being filed, third parties increasingly are suing consultants for environmental cleanup costs, economic losses, damages caused by unsuccessful business deals, and Superfund contribution costs. Representative cases include the following:
• A consultant was sued by an assignee of its contract for failing to identify hazardous waste contamination in its assessment report. 1 • After its business collapsed, a neighbor to General Electric's (GE's) contaminated property sued GE's consultant for negligently performing its site investigation. 2 • A company whose site came to be listed on the Superfund National Priorities List of sites sued the government's contractor whose alleged negligence led to the listing. 3 • A consultant hired to assist a client with regulatory compliance issues regarding a parcel of property was sued by an unknown purchaser of the property for residential housing who discovered substantial mercury contamination at the site. 4 • A consultant hired to observe and document underground tank excavation activities, perform soil and groundwater tests, remediate soil and groundwater contamination, and prepare reports and work plans to be filed with the state was sued by a purchaser of the property for failing to discover all underground tanks that were present on the property. 5 • A consultant hired by the government to identify environmental contamination in a building, including "readily accessible" asbestos, was sued by the building's purchaser to whom the consultant gave a letter summarizing the results of its inspection, which was provided at a cost of only $200. 6 • Owners of land adjacent to a landfill sued the landfill's consultant, alleging that the consultant failed to timely test for, and inform them of, the presence of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in their wells. 7 • A group of individuals "residing near" the Rocky Mountain Arsenal sued the government and Shell Oil Company for "personal injury and property damage as a result of airborne pollutants released during the joint cleanup effort at the Arsenal by Shell and the government."
8
• The purchaser (Lincoln) of contaminated property sued the seller (Orsetti) of the property. Prior to the purchase, Lincoln's consultant, Beta, stated that the property was "clear of contamination." Orsetti filed a negligence and fraud/misrepresentation complaint against Beta.
9
• A consultant hired to excavate and grade a portion of land for a proposed housing development was sued for Superfund contribution because it unknowingly spread some of the contaminated soil over parts of the property. 10 • A person that conducted a prepurchase soil investigation at a site was sued because, it was argued, the soil testing constituted a "disposal" of hazardous substances sufficient to trigger Superfund liability.
11
• An engineering firm hired to prepare engineering plans and drawings, assist in obtaining permits, and provide engineering and consulting services was alleged to be an "operator" of a landfill.
12

COMMON LAW LIABILITY OF CONSULTANTS
To Whom Does a Consultant Owe a Duty?
The most important legal element a plaintiff must establish in a suit against a consultant is the existence of a legal duty owed by the consultant to the third party. 13 The notion that a consultant owes a duty only to parties with which it directly contracts is wrong. The concept of privity, which traditionally limited a consultant's liability, no longer is applicable.
14 There is no bright line standard for determining precisely when a consultant owes a duty to a nonparty to its contract. Whether or not a duty exists is a matter of law decided by a judge. 15 The key factor in determining whether a duty exists is the concept of foreseeability of injury ("Duty and liability are only imposed where both the plaintiff and the risk are foreseeable to a reasonable person"   16 ). Foreseeability does not require a specific forecasting of particularly identifiable victims or a precise prediction of the exact harm that may result from the conduct. Instead, a party may be liable to persons who normally and generally fall within a zone of risk created by the particular tortious conduct. 17 Since almost every occurrence is theoretically foreseeable, whether a duty exists usually depends on a balancing of fairness and public policy considerations. 18 One commentator noted:
Asking whether the defendant owes the plaintiff a "duty" is simply another way of asking if the defendant ought to be liable to the plaintiff for its negligence, and "foreseeability" is merely a proxy for a policy determination about the scope of liability in a particular case. Determining foreseeability is always a judgment in hindsight about the degree of concern that the defendant should have had for the plaintiffs interests. Many harms are quite literally "foreseeable," yet for pragmatic reasons, no recovery is allowed.... A further inquiry must be made, for we recognize that "duty" is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the way to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection While it may seem that there should be a remedy for every wrong, this is an ideal limited perforce by the realities of this world. Every injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree The final step in the duty inquiry, then, is to make a determination of the fundamental policy of the law, as to whether the defendant's responsibility should extend to such results.
The court in Giantonnio v. Taccard summed up this cloudy area when it stated:
[Rlesolution of the question of whether a duty is owed and to whom often involves no more than a value judgment upon a factual complex rather than an evident application of a precise rule of law. The ultimate determination inevitably reflects the seasoning and experience of the one who judges. 21 Decisions in this area traditionally have focused more on the nature and scope of a consultant's undertaking rather than fairness and policy considerations. The decision in Midwest Aluminum Manufacturing Company v. General Electric Company 22 is a good example of the traditional conservative approach some courts have taken when considering a consultant's liability. In that case, Midwest was a neighbor of GE and alleged that contamination on GE's property caused Midwest's business failure. Midwest sued, inter alia, GE's consultant, Sirrine, alleging that Sirrine negligently performed its investigation and fraudulently misrepresented that it would fully and accurately study the contamination. The court dismissed Midwest's claim and held, " [T] here is no legal requirement known to this Court-and none was brought to the Court's attention-that an agent of one neighbor has a duty owed to another neighbor without some sort of an affirmative action taken by the agent." 23 Another example of a traditional analysis is Deangelo v. Exxon Corporation. 2i In that case, Exxon hired Handex, an environmental remediation company, to observe the excavation of tanks and to document ongoing tank removal activities at a former gasoline station. Handex issued several reports to Exxon, including one in July 1994, representing that all underground storage tanks had been removed from the site. After the plaintiff became interested in the property, he asked Exxon for its environmental reports regarding the cleanup of the property. Exxon turned over its data on the site, including Handex's reports. After the plaintiff purchased the property, Handex found additional tanks. The discovery delayed plaintiffs use of the property, and the plaintiff subsequently filed a lawsuit against Exxon and Handex. After the jury returned a verdict against Exxon and Handex, the verdict was granted, notwithstanding the defendants' motion for judgment. The New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the decision.
As to Handex, Deangelo argued that the company negligently failed to discover all underground storage tanks on the property. The court rejected Deangelo's arguments. It first reviewed the evidence and determined that Handex was not contractually bound to Exxon to identify all tanks. Thus, the court reasoned, Handex owed no such duty to the plaintiff:
To place that requirement [to identify all tanks] on Handex as a matter of law would have the practical effect of forcing a party to a contract to enlarge the scope of its work without compensation in order to protect itself against the possibility of a negligence suit by some third party. Aside from the fact that it would be unfair to impose such a duty on Handex, the relationship between the parties evidences no practical need to do so as a matter or [sic] policy. 25 Moreover, Handex's statement that there were no other tanks on the property justifiably was based on the information Exxon provided. The court refused to hold Handex liable based simply on an error in the company's report. In addition, it was important to the court that Deangelo hired his own expert who had the "means to avoid the risk of reliance on Handex's work. 26 Another good example of a traditional analysis of consultant liability is Sykes v. Propane Power Corporation.
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In Sykes, Sullivan
Engineering was hired to assist in obtaining an operating permit for a chemical recovery plant. In the course of its work, Sullivan prepared drawings detailing the layout and location of the facilities involved in the chemical recovery process, but it also conducted a safety engineering evaluation of the process. After an employee was killed in an explosion, it was determined that the cause of the accident was a defect in the recovery process. In affirming the summary judgment granted to Sullivan, the court focused on the "four corners" of Sullivan's contractual undertaking. Sullivan was retained simply to prepare generalized drawings of the processing system components in order to show how the chemicals were carried, stored, and discharged. 28 The court noted, "[g]iven the specific purpose for which Sullivan was hired, and the limited scope of the order which he was required to follow in preparing the documents . . . the trial court properly granted summary judgment." 29 The court reasoned that "the need to foresee and prevent a particular risk of harm from materializing should be commensurate with the degree of responsibility which the engineer has agreed to undertake." 30 
More Liberal Cases
The widely cited decision in Caldwell v. Bechtel, Inc., 51 is illustrative of the more liberal cases that hold consultants liable for a third party's injuries. In Caldwell, Bechtel contracted to provide "safety engineering services" to a transit authority and subsequently was sued by an equipment operator who allegedly contracted silicosis because of the allegedly negligent performance of Bechtel's duties. Reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeals held that Bechtel's liability was not limited to the four corners of its contract. The court stated:
While in contract law, only one to whom the contract specifies that a duty be rendered will have a cause of action for its breach, in tort law, society, not the contract, specifies to whom the duty is owed, and this has traditionally been the foreseeable plaintiff.
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Summing up, the court stated:
[Clourts have primarily premised an extension of liability to the site architect [consultant/contractor] upon its contractual undertaking on behalf of the project owner, and upon the resultant foreseeability of injury to workers in the event that the undertaking is negligently performed. We endorse this interpretation of the interrelationship of contractual duties owed to one party upon possible duty and tort owed to another party. 33 Another example of the liberal line of cases in this area is the decision in Howell v. Fisher. 54 In Howell, the plaintiffs were individuals who invested in a corporation on the basis of a soil testing report prepared for the company by a consultant. After the corporation became insolvent, the individuals sued the consultant even though they were not in privity of contract. Reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeals held that the case could proceed against the consultant. The court believed that a jury could find that it was reasonably foreseeable that the investors would be damaged if the reports were incorrect. The key allegations on which this holding relied were that the consultant knew the purpose of the report and who would see it, and that the report was intended to induce the plaintiffs to act (i.e., to invest in the corporation). 35 Another noteworthy case is Carvalho v. Toll Brothers and Developers^ in which the court did a "multi-dimensional" analysis to determine whether the consultant owed a duty to a third party. 37 In
Carvahlo, the plaintiffs decedent was killed when the walls of a trench in which he was working collapsed. The plaintiff claimed that an inspector hired by the project engineer to observe the performance of the work and who was present when the accident occurred had a duty to supervise safety procedures of the construction. The court framed the legal issue as whether the engineer had a legal duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of workers when he had a contractual responsibility for the progress of the work but not for the safety conditions, yet was aware of working conditions at the site that created a risk of serious injury to workers. 38 The court's holding that summary judgment should not have been granted to the consultant clearly shows that it was swayed by "considerations of fairness and policy" and "its value judgment, based on an analysis of public policy." Even though the consultant was not hired to assess safety concerns, the court noted that the consultant was at the site everyday and that there was "an overlap of work-progress considerations and work-safety concerns." In doing its "fairness" analysis, the court also focused on the fact that the consultant had the authority to take or require corrective measures if safety concerns affected the progress of the work, and that the consultant was aware of the risk of harm. It observed: "The existence of actual knowledge of an unsafe condition can be extremely important in considering the fairness in imposing a duty of care." 39 The court also stated that "the engineer had the opportunity and was in a position to foresee and discover the risk of harm and to exercise reasonable care to avert any harm." 40 In addition, the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that the "financial arrangements and understanding [between the consultant and its client] do not overcome the public policy that imposes a duty of care and ascribes a liability to the engineer in these circumstances."
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The Troubling Grand Street Artists Decision
The recent New Jersey federal court decision in Grand Street Artists v. General Electric Company (Grand Street) 42 is troubling for environmental consultants. This decision is a good example of the principle that "tort liability can be adapted to address areas in which recognition of a cause of action and the imposition of a duty of care are both novel and controversial." 43 In Grand Street, Quality Tool and Die Company (Quality) triggered New Jersey's property transfer cleanup statute (ECRA) by ceasing its operations, and a year later, it hired Jenny Engineering (Jenny) to assist it in addressing ECRA compliance issues. Jenny's undertaking was defined specifically in writing and was based on the accuracy of statements from the owner regarding site conditions and the history of operations. Jenny made no mention of any mercury contamination in its report filed with the state. Thereafter, Grand Street Artists (GSA), investigating whether to buy the property, hired its own consultant to conduct a "due diligence pre-purchase." This consultant, REM, reviewed Quality's ECRA case file and concluded that the level of contamination met current cleanup standards. Quality then sold the property to GSA, who intended to develop "customized urban homes." Several years later, mercury contamination was discovered on the property. GSA then sued numerous parties, including Jenny, and argued, inter alia, that Jenny's ECRA submissions were "materially false and misleading" because they failed to identify any mercury contamination. Jenny argued that it owed no duty to prospective purchasers.
According to the court, the legal issue in this instance was whether a defendant/environmental consultant who provides ECRA assistance to an owner who wishes to cease operations owes a duty to a plaintiff who has relied upon a review of the owner's ECRA submissions in making the decision to purchase the premises and convert them for residential use. 44 In reality, however, the court addressed the scope of a consultant's liability when it files reports available for public inspection. The court held that Jenny could have foreseen that real estate purchasers would rely on its reports. The court stated, "These ECRA submissions are public filings which were easily accessible to prospective purchasers. Thus, it was foreseeable that a potential purchaser would look to the prior ECRA submissions in considering whether to enter into the transaction." 45 The fact that the property was not for sale when Jenny did its work and that GSA did not know that the plaintiff was going to buy the property was not determinative. 46 Further, Jenny's "fairness and policy arguments" were rejected. The court reasoned that because the plaintiffs in the case purchased the premises and were not "remote," Jenny's liability was not endless. In also discrediting Jenny's argument that it was being exposed to significant liability, the court observed: "That the magnitude of the liability may be great does not by itself provide enough of a reason for not finding a duty. Environmental harm is often substantial." 47 Indeed, the court reasoned that these factors favored imposition of a duty. First, "the public has an interest in the proper compliance with ECRA to protect it against hazardous waste." 48 Second, there was some indication in the record that Jenny knew that the premises would be sold once the ECRA process was completed.
Although the Grand Street decision undoubtedly will increase the liability and exposure of consultants, its bounds are not endless. For example, courts often give literal meaning to nonreliance clauses in a contract. In Bronstein v. GZA Geoenvironmental, Inc., 49 the plaintiff contracted to purchase property and hired GZA to conduct an environmental survey. Once GZA completed its work, Bronstein assigned his rights to the BFM plaintiffs who purchased the property. After the sale, hazardous waste contamination was discovered on the property, and the owners sued GZA. The court affirmed the dismissal of GZA and held that the company owed no duty to the BFM plaintiffs. The court's decision was based on the language in the contract between GZA and Bronstein and the affirmative steps GZA took to limit reliance by others on its work. GZA wisely stated in writing that its report was prepared "for the exclusive use of [Bronstein] ." Further, the dissemination of the report was prohibited "without the prior written consent of GZA." Based on the limiting language in GZA's report, the court found that it was not reasonably foreseeable that Bronstein would furnish the information to the BFM plaintiffs or that the BFM plaintiffs would rely on the report. GZA, therefore, owed no duty of care to the BFM plaintiffs. 50 Despite these cases, consultants should not be deluded into believing that courts systematically enforce contractual limitation of liability clauses. In State Farm v. HHS Associates, Inc.,'' 1 for example, State Farm bought property from HHS that later was discovered to be contaminated. State Farm sued HHS's consultant, SMC, alleging that SMC negligently failed to discover that petrochemicals were present. SMC moved to dismiss the claim on the basis that its contract with HHS specifically repudiated any third-party reliance on its contract. Further, SMC argued, State Farm had no greater rights under the contract than HHS, and HHS agreed to indemnify SMC. Despite this contract language, the court permitted the case to go forward and held that, " 
SUPERFUND LIABILITIES OF CONSULTANTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND TYPICAL CASES
Consultants face substantial third-party liability under Superfund if they do not properly perform their work. This issue was discussed in Neiv Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corporation.^ In this case, Halliburton NUS Corporation (NUS) was hired by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to conduct a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) at the Tybout's Corner Landfill Site. The county thereafter sued NUS, alleging that NUS negligently installed a well that contributed to the contamination at the site. The court ruled that NUS could be liable to the county. NUS's liability was premised on Section 96l9(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), which provides:
(a) Liability of response action contractors (1) response action contractors A person who is a response action contractor with respect to any release or threatened release of a hazardous substance...shall not be liable under this subchapter or under any other Federal law to any person for injuries, costs, damages, expenses, or other liability (including but not limited to claims for indemnification or contribution and claims by third parties for death, personal injury, illness or loss of or damage to property or economic loss) which results from such release or threatened release.
(2) Negligence, etc.
Paragraph (1) shall not apply in the case of a release that is caused by conduct of the response action contractor which is negligent, grossly negligent, or which constitutes intentional misconduct.
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The court ruled in New Castle County that a response action contractor is liable to "any other person" who is harmed by the contractor's negligence. The court reasoned that the phrase "any other person" is broad and includes a potentially responsible party (PRP) such as the third-party plaintiff New Castle County? 5 The saving grace afforded to response action contractors pursuant to Section 96l9(a) is that they are held to a negligence rather than a strict liability standard of liability. If a consultant is not performing services for the government, it cannot rely on Section 9619 as a shield. Therefore, consultants who undertake work at a contaminated site could expose themselves to significant Superfund liability, which, of course, is strict, joint, and several. For example, in K.C. 1986 Limited Partnership v. Read Manufacturing, 56 a consultant (Terracon) installed wells at a contaminated site so that a prospective purchaser could decide whether to buy the property. Subsequently, significant contamination was found at the site, and the owner sued Terracon, inter alia, claiming that Terracon's installation of monitoring wells contributed to the site contamination. The court ruled that Terracon could be liable under Section 9607(a) (2) 57 of CERCLA as a party that "disposed" of hazardous wastes at the site, because disposal is not limited to the original introduction of a hazardous material at a site. In refusing to immunize from CERCLA liability a consultant who does preacquisition soil testing, the court explained:
When Congress wished to relax the strict liability standard of CERCLA, it expressly did so. CERCLA has a specific section for persons providing care and advice during cleanup and no reference is made to environmental testing. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d). Nor were environmental investigators given any protection in 42 U.S.C. § 9619 which limits the liability of response action contractors who are working for the government or are working for a private responsible party under the supervision of the government. Nor did Congress create a special defense for environmental testers. 58 The court in K.C. 1986also ruled that a consultant could be liable as an "operator" under Section 9607(a)(2) of CERCLA. 59 In order to determine whether Terracon was liable as an operator, the court examined whether a disposal occurred during the consultant's activity at the site and whether Terracon "had authority to determine whether and how hazardous waste would be disposed of and exercised that authority during its involvement with the site." 60 Since Terracon specifically was retained to determine the environmental status at the site, prepared a plan to investigate the site, had access to the site, and decided how and where to install the monitoring wells at issue, a question of fact existed as to whether Terracon was an operator. 61 
Another noteworthy case is Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation v. Catellus Development Corporation^2
In that case, Catellus sought contribution from Ferry, the company hired by Catellus's predecessor to excavate and grade a portion of the land for a proposed housing development, for the cost of cleaning up a contaminated site. While excavating the development site, Ferry had spread some of the displaced soil over other parts of the property. Catellus claimed that Ferry exacerbated the extent of the contamination by spreading contaminated soil over clean areas of the property. The Ninth Circuit decided that Catellus could be liable under CERCLA. First, the court held that Ferry could be liable as an "operator" if it "had authority to control the cause of the contamination at the time the hazardous substances were released into the environment." 63 The court found that Ferry had "disposed of hazardous substances because the term includes "the dispersal of contaminated soil during the excavation and grading of a development site." 64 The Ninth Circuit also ruled that Ferry could be liable as a "transporter" under Section 9607(a)(4) of CERCLA. 65 Since CERCLA defines "transportation" as "the movement of a hazardous substance by any mode,"
66 Ferry could be a transporter because it necessarily moved the contaminated soil when it excavated and graded the property. 67 The court ruled that the movement of contaminated soil "on-site" could subject a consultant to CERCLA liability, reasoning:
There is no logical basis for a defendant's liability as a "transporter" under section 9607(a)(4) to hinge solely on whether he moves hazardous substances across a recognized property boundary. 69 In Tanglewood East, the court ruled that a consultant that dispersed contaminated soil during the construction of a housing subdivision could be strictly liable under CERCLA as a person who "arranged for disposal or treatment" of hazardous substances. The court reasoned that "since disposal may be merely the 'placing of any...hazardous waste into or on any land. . . ,'" Section 6903(3), those who move the waste about the site may fall within the terms of the provision.
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The foregoing decisions contrast with United States v. CDMG Realty Company? 1 In CDMG, the purchaser of contaminated property sought contribution from Dowel Associates, claiming that a soil investigation conducted by Dowel spread contamination at the site. Although the court agreed that a soil investigation could be a disposal pursuant to CERCLA, 72 unlike the courts in other cases, it refused to hold the consultant strictly liable. The court held that the consultant could be liable only if the plaintiff proved that the soil investigation was negligent, concluding:
Thus, it is not enough for plaintiff to show that a soil investigation has caused the spread of contaminants. Rather, we conclude that in order to establish that "disposal" has occurred based on a soil investigation, a plaintiff must also show that the investigation was conducted negligently. 73 The court reasoned that if a person was strictly liable for spreading contaminants during a soil investigation, it would discourage prepurchase due diligence. The court in CDMG differed from other circuits in that it interposed a negligence standard that, in its view, "harmonize[d] CERCLA's clear intention to allow soil investigations and its goal of remedying hazardous waste sites."
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HOW CONSULTANTS CAN REDUCE THEIR RISK AND EXPOSURE TO THIRD-PARTIES LAWSUITS
Recent case law compels consultants to take practical and reasonable steps to reduce their potential liability to third parties. There also are measures that a consultant can take to evaluate its exposure and make an informed decision to accept a risk. At a minimum, consults should:
1. Reexamine standard language in contracts to ensure that the terms and provisions accurately reflect the scope of services the consultant agrees to undertake and that important terms are specifically defined. 2. Ensure that the contract plainly and clearly delineates the scope of the consultant's undertaking. There should be standard procedures for modifications to the scope of work, and all changes to the scope of work should be put in writing. 3. Document that the work or report is to be done only for the benefit of the contracting party, or have a written understanding of the purpose of the work and who it is designed to benefit. Include "no reliance clauses" and explicit statements that a report is only for the benefit of the contracting parties and reliance by anyone else is not authorized. 4. Include confidentiality provisions in contracts that limit the right to distribute the report or any information contained therein.. 5. Specifically tailor "hold harmless" and indemnity provisions to the work at issue. 6. Specifically mention instances when information and data have been obtained from a client or third party. The consultant should not vouch for the accuracy of information about which it may have some doubts. 7. Specifically identify in the contract the substantive law governing the transaction. 8. Not undertake services beyond those squarely delineated in the contract nor manifest an intent or understanding that work will benefit a third party. 9. Obtain assurances and written affirmations that work is not intended to benefit a particular class of persons (e.g., prospective purchasers of real estate). 10. Document the governmental standards and requirements framing the scope of the undertaking. 11. Disclaim responsibility for toxic, hazardous, or other dangerous substances that may be discovered. 12. Convince the client to make written representations and warranties concerning what it knows about the site. 13-Obtain appropriate insurance coverage.
SUMMARY
Lawyers for environmental consultants must be aware that their clients increasingly are being named in lawsuits filed by plaintiffs with whom they did not contract. Liability may arise under common law principles and the federal Superfund statute. Recent case law indicates a trend toward expanding the scope of a consultant's liabilities. In the common law area, the Grand Street decision has the potential to drastically increase the exposure of consultants since, at one time or another, almost everyone involved in the business files a report available for public inspection. In the Superfund context, the Kaiser Aluminum and Tanglewood East decisions also are troublesome. Nevertheless, other recent cases indicate that a consultant's duties are not limitless. Even if a consultant makes a mistake, it will not result in liability if no duty was owed to the plaintiff or there was no justifiable reliance on the mistake. Further, in the Superfund context, some courts refuse to hold consultants strictly liable and require a plaintiff to prove negligence. In addition, some courts strictly enforce contractual limitation of liability clauses. Perhaps the most important lesson in this discussion is that consultants need to develop a heightened sensitivity to the potential for new claims. Although all risks cannot be completely eliminated, consultants and their lawyers can take concrete practical steps to avoid or reduce their liability to third parties. (1) had authority to determine whether hazardous waste would be disposed of and to determine the method of disposal and (2) actually exercised that authority, either by personally performing the task necessary to dispose of the hazardous waste or by directing others to perform those tasks. 
Id. The court continued:
We conclude that liability may be imposed under section 9607(a)(4) for transporting hazardous material to an uncontaminated area of property, regardless of whether the material was conveyed to a separate parcel of land. Catellus's allegations that Ferry excavated the contaminated soil from one area of the property and moved it to another are sufficient to allege potential liability predicated upon 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4 
